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An anecdote related by Herodotus in his Lydian logos seems to interpret in 
a dramatized way the relation of Lydia with the sea. The historian reports that 
Croesus planned to build ships in order to attack the Greeks of the isles in front of 
Asia Minor. When all was ready for shipbuilding, Bias of Priene (or Pittacus of 
Mytilene) came to Sardis. The king asked him for any news concerning Greece 
and the Sage answered that the people of the isles were buying up ten thousand 
horses, intending to make an expedition against him. Taking that for true, Croesus 
said he wished the gods would inspire the islanders to do that, to attack on horse-
back the sons of the Lydians. And the other replied that the king seemed to pray 
eagerly to catch the islanders riding on the mainland, but what else did he think 
the people of the isles were praying for, as soon as they heard he was going to 
build a navy, than to catch the Lydians on the sea, and so to take vengeance on 
him for the Greeks of the mainland whom he had enslaved? The king was pleased 
with this answer, understood its meaning, and stopped shipbuilding. Then he 
signed a pact of guest-friendship (ξεινίη) with the Ionians inhabiting the islands1.  
 
The story dramatizes information which seems to be historical, concerning 
the accord signed by Croesus with the Ionian islands. This agreement, involving 
diplomatic hospitality rather than military alliance, is explained as a turning point 
in the aggressive policy adopted by the Mermnads, and especially by Croesus, 
towards the Greeks. Looking for the overseas trade of the main roads of Lydia and 
Anatolia, Gyges captured the asty of Colophon: he also led a campaign against 
 
* Nikos Birgalias has passionately cultivated a generous, and inclusive, project of a common 
research to be built in friendship. Those dancing days are gone, but his memory and legacy are still 
alive. I dedicate these pages to him. 
1 Hdt. I 27 = T71 Pedley. Cf. also Diod. IX 25 Vogel/9 fr.37.1 Cohen-Skalli (T70 Pedley) and 
Polyaen. I 26. 
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Miletus and Smyrna2. Ardys seized Priene and took up an expedition against Mi-
letus3. Alyattes finally took Smyrna and attacked Clazomenae: above all, he 
waged a long war against Miletus, along with his father Sadyattes and then alone4. 
None of these kings attacked the islands. When he planned to build ships, Croesus 
had already subjugated and made tributary to him all the Ionian, Aeolian, and Do-
rian cities of the mainland5. He obliged all of them to pay a tribute and to provide 
military services6. The planned campaign against the islanders - the Ionian islands 
with which agreements will be signed - should presumably aim either to make 
them tributary as well or to seize their ships. A parallel tradition – which has gone 
down to the 1st-2nd century CE Life of Aesop and lies in an unclear relationship 
of dependence with Herodotus’ anecdote - provides an identical, and better fo-
cused, situation. It knows of Croesus’ threat to attack Samos but entrusts to the 
fabulist the same role of diplomat as that played in Herodotus by one of the Sages. 
In this variant of the story, Croesus intended to make the Samians tributary to 
himself7.  
 
The historical background of the anecdote is well founded and clearly in-
cludes the real existence of both a Lydian cavalry and Greek fleets. Lydia only 
had land forces and the Ionian islands in front of the Anatolian coast obviously 
founded any power on ships. Which were these Ionian islands? Certainly Samos 
had a navy in those days but we wonder whether Chios also had one8. In fact, 
Herodotus and Thucydides date Samian sea-power to the later days of Polycrates 
and Cambyses, not before9. All the same, Herodotus relates the Samians attacked 
the Lacedaemonians in warships and carried off the precious bronze crater the 
latter were shipping to Croesus some time before the capture of Sardis in ca. 547/6 
BCE10. On the other hand, Croesus did not have naval power, nor did his prede-
cessors. Back in the past, Diodorus, probably drawing on Castor of Rhodes, 
knows of a ninety-two year long Lydian and Maeonian thalassocracy soon after 
the Trojan War11. The only tradition which could ‘explain’ such obscure mythical 
 
2 Hdt. I 14. On Lydian trade and its ‘invention’, cf. § 94.1 with Hanfmann 1983, 80-83 and 
Paradiso 2012.  
3 Hdt. I 15. 
4 Hdt. I 16-22.  
5 Hdt. I 26, 3 and 27, 1: cf. I 6 and 28. 
6 Hdt. I 6, 2 and 27, 1; Xen. Cyr. VI 2, 10: cf. Hdt. I 76-7 and 141. 
7 Vitae G + W, 92. See Kurke 2011, 126-36. 
8 Chios had sea-power at the time of Cyrus and Cambyses according to Poppo-Stahl and 
Gomme, both commenting on Thuc. I 13; it had not for Wallinga 1993, 66-67 and nn. 2 and 3.  
9 Hdt. III 122, 2; Thuc. I 13, 3 and 6. 
10 Hdt. I 70.  
11 Diod. VII 11 Vogel/7 fr. 9 Cohen-Skalli: Cast. FGrHist/BNJ 250, T 1.  
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data would be Herodotus’ report on the Lydian expedition to the western Medi-
terranean Sea and the foundation of the Tyrrhenian colony in the ancient times of 
King Atys, the eponym of the Atyads who reigned in Lydia before the Heraclids12. 
However, this tradition was unknown to the best authority on Lydian history, Xan-
thus of Lydia, and Herodotus himself located the shipbuilding in Greek Smyrna, 
so backdating to mythical times the lack of Lydian harbours13. In historical times, 
the kings of Lydia certainly did not have a maritime power. That explains the long 
land siege Alyattes laid to Miletus, that is against people who were masters of the 
sea so that the Lydians could not resort to a naval blockade14. The absence of a 
Lydian navy also explains what prevented Alyattes and Croesus from punishing, 
on two occasions, the Samians who had stolen, thanks to their warships, some 
‘goods’ sent to Lydia from Corinth and Sparta. Those ‘goods’ were both the young 
sons of the Corcyraeans Periander sent to Alyattes to be made eunuchs and then 
saved by the Samians, and the crater sent by the Lacedaemonians and then either 
stolen by the Samians (according to the Spartans) or sold by the people who were 
carrying it (according to the Samians) 15. The military servitudes imposed on 
Greek poleis certainly provided Croesus with military contingents. Yet, if such 
servitudes also involved the fleets, we completely lack information about sea op-
erations led by Croesus.  
 
On the other hand, the existence of an excellent Lydian cavalry in Croesus’ 
time is also founded on historical evidence. Indeed, the reputation of Lydian 
horsemanship is more ancient and well attested in Greek sources such as Homer, 
Mimnermus, Bacchylides, and Pindar16. Xanthus of Lydia, transmitted by Nico-
laus of Damascus, relates that King Ardys, three generations before Gyges (ca. 
680 - ca. 645 BCE), ordered a census of the army to be made and the number of 
the horsemen was found to be around 30,000. Xanthus may have transmitted an 
‘official’ number, drawn from the Lydian archives and therefore too high17. How-
ever, that number is indirectly strengthened by further information. Xanthus re-
ports that, in Gyges’ time, the Smyrnaean poet Magnes sang of the bravery of the 
Lydians in a cavalry battle – ἐν ἱπποµαχίᾳ – against the Amazons18. Herodotus’ 
 
12 Myres 1906, 127-130 with Hdt. I 94, 2-7, at 6.  
13 Xanth. Lyd. FGrH/BNJ 765, F 16.  
14 Hdt. I 17-18.  
15 Hdt. III 48 (the boys) and I 70 (the crater). 
16 Hom. Il. IV 141-5; Mimn. fr.14 West2/15 Allen; Bacchyl. III 23-4, and Pind. fr. 206 Maehler.  
17 Nic. Dam. FGrHist 90, F 44/Xanth. Lyd. BNJ 765, F 34a, § 7 (Lydian archives) and § 10 
(census), with Talamo 1979, 134-138.  
18 Nic. Dam. FGrHist 90, F 62 = Xanth. Lyd. BNJ 765, F 38. 
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praise of Lydian horsemanship is entirely focused on Croesus’ time and culmi-
nates with a warm eulogy of it19. In Herodotus’ narrative, Lydian cavalry plays a 
key role before the last fight between Croesus and Cyrus (when the Lydian dreamt 
of horses which ate snakes20), during the battle (when the Lydians were defeated 
because the scent of the camels disturbed their animals21) and soon after it (when 
they were deprived of war weapons, including their horses22). Archaeological 
findings do match such an excellent reputation and its results in Lydian culture. 
Direct evidence for Lydian horsemanship consists of iron bits and bronze bridle 
attachments from Sardis, the latter being sometimes decorated with Nomadic mo-
tifs, probably of Cimmerian or Scythian origin23. More nuanced should be the in-
terpretation of pottery, which may belong to Greek, or Greek-inspired, work-
shops. The fragments of a seventh-century (third quarter) relief-ware vase, 
excavated at Sardis in 1914, show what should be a magnificent parade of non-
armed riders, separately modelled in gray clay and then applied to the vase itself24. 
The horsemen should be all dressed in a short, belted and checkered chiton (a 
garment of Oriental stuffs?); the horses, surely of ‘Asiatic’ breed, show heavy 
chests, broad necks, but long and thin legs. The vase was of Greek, not Oriental, 
inspiration: it was made either in an Ionian atelier of the coast or else by a Greek 
potter working in Sardis, but it reproduced non-Greek riders. An image more al-
lusive to a specifically Lydian context may be found on an architectural terracotta 
decorative type - reportedly from Düver in Pisidia - which shows a rider mounted 
on a rearing horse, wearing an earring and oriental trousers25.  
 
Thanks to historical data, Herodotus’ anecdote works like an aition. In the 
minimal space of a quick dialogue, the short story mixes up historical and moral 
features: information about the treaties of guest-friendship and the power of both 
Lydia and the Ionian isles with wise advice of either Bias or Pittacus. As is well 
known, the Delphic tradition which goes down to Herodotus and then to Ephorus 
associates the name of Croesus with the most illustrious Greek intellectuals, and 
above all with some of the Sages, not only Bias and Pittacus but also Solon and 
 
19 Hdt. I 79. 
20 Hdt. I 78. The oracle of Telmessus interpreted the horses as a reference to the Persians: how-
ever, it may have forced the more natural identification of the horses with the Lydians after the event. 
See Griffiths 2001, 161-165. 
21 Hdt. I 80. 
22 Hdt. I 155. 
23 Greenewalt jr. 2010, 218, nr. 48-50, fig. 6.  
24 Hanfmann 1945, 570-81; Greenewalt 1979, 20-1. 
25 Greenewalt jr. 2010, 217 and 221, fig. 5. Riders figure on a marble panel from Bin Tepe 
(Hanfmann and Ramage 1978, 156 n. 231, fig. 401) and a bridled horse head decorates the fragment 
of a lebes or a crater (Greenewalt jr. 2010, 221, fig. 4.) 
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Thales, almost all of them introduced as visitors at the court of Sardis26. Epho-
rus/Diodorus reports that Pittacus met Croesus and refused the gift of as much 
money from his treasury as he might wish to take, claiming he had already twice 
as much as he wished, since he had inherited an estate from his brother27. Such an 
out-of-scale comparison implies of course freedom from avarice and independ-
ence from the king. Dignity and the sense of a peer relationship also weave the 
Herodotean story. It does exploit the motif of the wise adviser of a tyrant but more 
precisely a variant of it28. In a sense, the dialogue and Bias’ (or Pittacus’) advice 
recall either the meeting and the advice given by Solon to Croesus 29 or the advise 
given to the king by his Lydian fellow Sandanis, who tried to divert him from the 
war against Cyrus30. However, Bias’ attitude seems different. He neither gives 
Croesus a moral lesson nor does he speak in order to protect him. Bias offers ad-
vice to the king, but that advice is primarily, or even solely, intended to protect the 
islanders. In that sense, it is not even advice: it is only a ruse, that is a deceptive 
and interested manipulation of reality.  
 
The identity of the Greek protagonist of the story was already challenged by 
ancient tradition, which suggested to Herodotus two names, and even let drop a 
third name, that of Aesop as Croesus’ interlocutor in what appears to be a further 
variant of the story itself, in a multiplication of names and situations which is 
typical of ‘liquid’ traditions. In Herodotus, the initiative of the meeting is at-
tributed to either Bias or Pittacus: possibly, an older tradition mentioned Pittacus, 
then it was rearranged and switched the protagonist, choosing Bias for evident 
chronological reasons. Pittacus – a contemporary of Alyattes, from Aeolian 
Mitylene – was not the best placed to discourage Croesus from attacking the Io-
nian islands31.  At first view, Bias does not seem so either, since he was a contem-
porary of Croesus and Cyrus but came from Priene, since, in similar traditions, 
Sages usually represent their own cities32. So, the accent appears only to fall on 
the cultural (and not historical) identity of the protagonist. Nonetheless, the anec-
dote may be included in a long tradition which makes of Bias not only a clever 
advocate and a brilliant orator until the last day of his life, but also a far-sighted 
 
26 Hdt. I 27-33 and 75, 3. See also Ephor. FGrH/BNJ 70, F 181 and Diod. IX 25-28 Vogel/9, 
frr. 37-39 Cohen-Skalli, with Parmeggiani 2011, 298-302. 
27 Diod. IX 12, 2 Vogel/9, fr.19 Cohen-Skalli. On Diodorus’ dependence on Ephorus, cf. 
Schwartz 1903, coll. 678-679. 
28 Bischoff 19652, 315; Lattimore 1939, 25, 30-31, 34-35. 
29 Hdt. I 32, 7. 
30 Hdt. I 71, 2-4. 
31 Diog. Laert. I 79 dates Pittacus’ floruit to the 42th Olympiad (612/11-609/8 BCE) and his 
death to the third year of the 52nd Olympiad, i.e. 570/69 BCE.  
32 Cf. Plut. Quast. Gr. 20, 296ab and Diog. Laert. I 25 and 83-4, with Kurke 2011, 127.  
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politician, able to exploit all the ruses of speech and action for noble political 
aims33. Bias achieved a diplomatic success as ambassador of Priene at Samos on 
the occasion of a war that had broken out between the two of them and such a 
success may explain why tradition chose him to mediate between Croesus and the 
Ionian islands34. His quality of global defender of the Ionian interests also comes 
to light in the political advice he gave to the Ionians defeated by Harpagus, ex-
horting them to leave all together for Sardinia and found there a city35. However, 
it is a different biographical feature which most suits the protagonist of the en-
counter with Croesus. While reporting the siege of Priene by Alyattes, Diogenes 
Laertius describes the double cunning solution adopted by Bias: he fattened two 
mules and drove them towards the enemy camp. Seeing them, Alyattes was dis-
appointed to learn that the prosperity of the besieged also extended to their ani-
mals, so he decided to make a truce. Bias made some heaps of sand and covered 
them with wheat, then he showed them to the king’s ambassador and finally Al-
yattes made peace with Priene36. The structure and meaning of this anecdote fit 
well the story of Bias’ speech to Croesus. In both, through either action or speech, 
Bias forges a magnificent reality. He creates an illusion able to impress and cheat 
the adversary, who is always a Lydian king, through the deliberately boastful ex-
aggeration of power, a technique for inducing the other to believe one is more 
powerful than he really is and so aiming to negotiate a greater result. This is the 
meaning of both the false wealth in animals and crops and the equally false land 
power in cavalry, claimed for the islanders.  
 
The dialogue between Croesus and Bias raises a symbolic opposition of the 
horse to the sea. It effects a radical, and simplified, separation between land and 
sea, between two different and historical powers (Lydian cavalry and Greek 
fleets), and the two peoples who are meant to excel in each of them: Lydia and, 
globally considered, the Greek islanders37. The latter are meant not as Ionians but 
as a compact political body of Greeks who buy horses all together and in full 
agreement (συνωνέονται) and with whom Croesus seems to sign only one treaty 
of guest-friendship (ξεινίη, in the singular). A further opposition is rhetorically 
provided by the geographical reversal of those powers, which fictionally attributes 
a navy to Lydia and a cavalry to the Greek isles. Bias, the expert orator, has re-
course to a brilliant device, the reductio ad absurdum. Through it, he opposes, on 
 
33 Diog. Laert. I 84. 
34 Aristot. fr. 576 Rose, IG XII. 6, 155, ll.15-23. See also Plut. Quaest. Gr. 20, 296ab. 
35 Hdt. I 170.  
36 Diog. Laert. I 83. The ruse is attributed to Thrasybulus on the occasion of Alyattes’ siege of 
Miletus by Hdt. I 21-2. 
37 On the distinction, and even the opposition, between islands and mainland in ancient Greek 
thought, with reference to the Croesus-Bias episode, see Ceccarelli 1996, 45-46; Payen 1997, 282, 
288-289; Constantakopoulou 2007, 17; Fantasia 2009, 13 and n.2. 
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the one hand, the absurd cavalry of the islanders to the real Lydian one and, on the 
other hand, the real fleets of the Greek isles to Croesus’ navy to be. By opposing 
these four elements, Bias puts on the same plane, as members of the rhetorical 
quartet, the inexistent Greek cavalry and a Lydian navy already in preparation. 
The absurdum which founds the oppositions of the two couples of four elements 
stresses of course the first of them, the image of insular cavalry. As well as at 
Priene besieged by Alyattes, Bias forges here a false and powerful image of the 
islanders’ cavalry, whose illusory existence is only founded on the real image of 
the ongoing Lydian navy to which it is indirectly compared, so acquiring the same 
reality status. By this means, Bias suggests a captious argument he proposes how-
ever as true: the danger that this – inexistent! – insular cavalry may represent for 
Croesus and his horsemen. The opposition of the fallacious cavalry of the isles to 
the real Lydian one only helps to introduce a second opposition, the most im-
portant, which aims to impress the king: that of the real fleet of the islanders vs. 
Croesus’ future navy. The second opposition is also somehow fictional, as it puts 
on the same plane a reality in construction (Croesus’ fleet) to a partial reality, 
which is introduced however as powerful and global (the fleets of some Ionian 
islands rather than an allied insular fleet). So, the ‘insular fleet’ ends by playing 
rhetorically rather than historically the same strong and absolute role as Lydian 
cavalry within the structure of Bias’ speech.  
 
Thus, Herodotus’ encounter-story seems to be a fictional anecdote intention-
ally organized around two famous personages. We cannot doubt the historical 
truth of its basic elements, namely Lydian cavalry and at least the sea-power of 
Samos. We doubt of course the encounter itself, whose historicity is undermined 
by the multiplication of the Greek protagonists. May we also doubt the main in-
formation, the shipbuilding project and its partial fulfilment, which sometimes has 
been looked at sceptically but never concretely challenged and discussed in de-
tail38? Of course, the project concerned the equipment of a navy. Vessels already 
allowed the Lydians to sail on diplomatic routes through both the Aegean and the 
Mediterranean Sea39. Theoretically, Croesus can have planned to build a powerful 
navy to be moored in the Trojan harbour of Adramytteion he controlled, since he 
had been its governor before becoming king40. He could have done it thanks to the 
 
38 Croesus’ menace is admitted by La Bua 1977, 15; Lombardo 1980, 189; Asheri, ad locum. 
Others (e.g. Schubert 1884, 65; Radet 1893, 215-216; Hirsch 1986, 226-227; Briquel 1991, 85 n. 
297; Carusi 2003, 253; Ceccarelli 1996, 45 n.16; Kurke 2011, 126-136; Branscome 2015, 245-251, 
at 246) are more sceptical about Croesus’ defiance to Ionian sea-power, or simply analyse the whole 
episode as an anecdote, so in a different perspective. 
39 For Lydia’s links with Delphi, Athens, Boeotia, Corinth and above all Sparta, its own ally, 
cf. Hdt. I 6, 2; 53, 3; 56, 2; 65-70; 77; 82-3.  
40 Hanfmann 1983, 245, n. 65. Cf. Nic. Dam. FGrH/BNJ 90, F 65 = Xanth. Lyd. BNJ 765, F 
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plentiful timber of the interior and the skilled labour which he could rely on. Lyd-
ian vegetation included an abundance of trees such as varieties of Quercus (oak), 
Pinus (pine), and Cedrus (cedar) in the eastern part of the country and on the 
slopes of mountain ranges such as Mt. Tmolus41. Naval craftsmanship obviously 
requires specialized skills but Croesus could have enrolled Ionian dockyard hands 
and, after all, such a solution is appealed to by the mythical story of Lydian ship-
building in Greek Smyrna at the time of the Tyrrhenian colonization42. Moreover, 
Croesus had at his disposal excellent craftsmen who could specialize in it. In a 
different field, the skills of Lydian artisans were praised. The foundation charter 
of the palace of Darius I at Susa (DSf) shows that during the construction of the 
palace itself Lydian craftsmen worked as masons and carpenters43. Accordingly, 
Croesus’ project would not have been materially impossible to fulfil. Its strategic 
aim would have been to match the naval power of the Greek islands, in order to 
keep on assuring Lydian markets to the sea.  
 
If Croesus did start the plan, the point of course is to understand why and 
when he stopped it. One thinks immediately of the Medo-Persian war as the main 
reason which distracted him from equipping a navy44. Such a war risked the treaty 
Alyattes and Cyaxares had signed in 585 BCE, which fixed the border between 
Media and Lydia at the river Halys45. The Chronicle of Nabonidus dates Cyrus’ 
capture of Ecbatana to the seventh year of Nabonidus’ reign, that is to 550/549 
BCE46. However, it only deals with Astyages’ response to Cyrus’ rebellion, so 
with the last stage of the war. Another eastern source, the Nabonidus Cylinder 
from Sippar, dates the beginning of the war three years earlier, to 553 BCE47. Cy-
rus overthrew the Mede Astyages not through a quick campaign but at the end of 
three years of hard fighting which only found a solution when Ecbatana was 
seized. According to Greek sources as well - Herodotus and Ctesias - Cyrus was 
defeated in the course of the war but also prevailed at least in a battle some time 
before the happy end48. All these data substantially agree with Herodotus’ global 
 
41a. 
41 Cf. Hanfmann 1983, 6-7 and Roosevelt 2009, 48-49. According to a letter of Antiochos III 
citizens were allowed to cut wood from the royal forests of Tarantzoi during the reconstruction of 
Sardis of 213 BCE: cf. Gauthier 1989, 13-15. 
42 Hdt. I 94, 6. 
43 DsF §§ 12-13: Kuhrt 2007, 492.  
44 How-Wells, ad locum. 
45 Hdt. I 72, 2; 73-4. 
46 The Nabonidus Chronicle II 1-4: Grayson 1975, 106. See Briant 1996, 41-3 and Kuhrt 2007, 
47-53. 
47 Kuhrt 2007, 56-7.  
48 Hdt. I 127, 3; 128, 1; Nic. Dam. FGrH/BNJ 90, F 66, §§ 28-30 ( = Ctes. F8d* §§ 28-30 
Lenfant). 
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reconstruction of the events. In Herodotus’ chronology, that is in the succession 
of the events recorded by his narrative, the shipbuilding plan is dated after the 
conquest of the Greek cities of the mainland, which is dated in turn to the first 
period of Croesus’ reign49. After Croesus’ encounter with Bias (I 27), Herodotus 
mainly records the meeting with Solon (I 29-33), then a private sorrow (the tragic 
death of the king’s son Atys: I 34-45) and, two years later, the fatal turning point, 
Cyrus’ conquest of Media (I 46), followed three years later by Croesus’ attack on 
Cyrus and the capture of Sardis50. In I 46 Herodotus suggests that Croesus only 
worried about the eastern events and stopped his mourning after Cyrus’ victory 
over the Mede, and even some time after it, when he realized that the Persian 
power was increasing and decided to forestall it before it became too great. At 
ch.73, however, still Herodotus attributes to Croesus not a defensive and slow 
strategy, but an attack against Cyrus, mainly for the sake of more land in addition 
to his own (καὶ γῆς ἱµέρῳ προσκτήσασθαι πρὸς τὴν ἑωυτοῦ µοῖραν βουλό-
µενος). An imperialistic attack is conceivable and has been even claimed as the 
true reason which induced Croesus to start the war, so restarting the aggressive 
politics of his father Alyattes51. It could imply an earlier attention to the eastern 
events, to be dated some time after 553 and before 550 BCE, when the outcome 
of the war between Cyrus and Astyages was still uncertain but Cyrus turned out 
to be successful, rather than after 550/549 BCE, when the Persian definitively 
prevailed over the Mede, or even afterwards, when Croesus would have realized 
the danger of the increasing Persian power52. If so, Croesus’ attention to the Medo-
Persian war should be dated precisely during the two years of mourning, started 
in ca. 552 BCE, which could also be meant as a long period of vigilant waiting 
and remote preparation. Accordingly, the events which had been happening to the 
east of Lydia since 553 BCE could have dissuaded Croesus from shipbuilding and 
persuaded him to assure or even extend the eastern border of his kingdom rather 
than the western, suddenly become less attractive from a strategical point of view. 
If it was historical, shipbuilding must have been planned and partially fulfilled 
between ca. 560 BCE (the beginning of Croesus’ reign53) or, better, some time 
(years?) after 560 BCE (certainly after Croesus took his revenge against his ene-
mies and vanquished the Greek mainland) and some time between 553 and 550 
BCE, when both a private sorrow and Cyrus’ revolt against Astyages distracted 
 
49 Hdt. I 6 and 26.  
50 The three extra years of kingship, allegedly granted to Croesus by the Delphic god, could 
only be reckoned from Cyrus’ victory over Astyages. Cf. Hdt. I 91. 
51 Beloch 1924, 371; La Bua 1977, 32-5. Still at the eve of the war, the Persians did not repre-
sent a threat for Lydia in the opinion of Lydian Sandanis: cf. Hdt. I 71. 
52 On Croesus’ war preparations in 549 BCE, cf. instead Schubert 1884, 92 and Radet 1893, 244. 
53 Croesus was defeated ca. 547/6 BCE, after reigning for fourteen years and fourteen days 
(Hdt. I 86): so, his reign began ca. 560 BCE. On 547/6 BCE as the date for the capture of Sardis of 
The Nabonidus Chronicle II 16-17 (Grayson 1975, 107 and 282), see now Rollinger 2008.  
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his attention. It must have been the last military plan involving the Greeks of the 
western border. Consequently, it seems possible that Croesus did programme, and 
partially fulfil, a concrete plan of building a navy to attack the islanders, before 
giving it up when his attention was driven to the events which were happening on 
the eastern border. It seems also possible that a Greek tradition reshaped the story 
of Croesus’ renunciation of the plan, by ruling out the true reason (the war be-
tween Cyrus and Astyages and the interest it aroused) and inventing in place of it 
a patriotic role for a Greek Sage, so including him directly and powerfully in the 
great Lydian history and indirectly in the main history of the Lydian relationship 
with Media through the anecdote of his successful diplomatic encounter with the 
Lydian king. 
 
This reconstruction shows however some weak points, so that we cannot 
completely exclude a different scenario for Croesus’ relationship to the Greek sea-
powers and may even challenge the Herodotean information on the king’s project 
and above all its fulfilment. The starting point is that Herodotus does not know 
about a merely theoretical project Croesus would have easily given up. He knows 
of a concrete, and quite advanced, plan of shipbuilding, involving big invest-
ments, which the king seems oddly to abandon soon after the diplomatic meeting 
with Bias. But if the encounter-story is not believable in itself, we have to look for 
a more important reason behind Croesus’ sudden decision to stop the ongoing 
project. ‘All was ready for shipbuilding’ (ἐόντων δέ οἱ πάντων ἑτοίµων ἐς τὴν 
ναυπηγίην), so openly declared, means that at least both the material (the cut 
wood) and the labour (the skilful carpenters) - in a word, the navy yards - were 
ready to start such a high profile project. Croesus could have renounced it to de-
vote his attention and energies to the Medo-Persian war if it had already broken 
out. However, the shipbuilding plan is chronologically separated from that war by 
at least one or more events. Though dimly, Herodotus condenses in ch. 28 pre-
cious information about one or more military campaigns Croesus led after the 
meeting with Bias and before the visit of Solon to Sardis. The chapter is intro-
duced through χρόνου δὲ ἐπιγινοµένου καὶ κατεστραµµένων σχεδὸν πάντων 
τῶν ἐντὸς Ἅλυος ποταµοῦ οἰκηµένων, ‘as time went on and almost all the peo-
ples west of the Halys had been subjected’, followed by the list of the subdued 
peoples. The list shows that the greatest part of those campaigns had not been 
conducted by Croesus after stopping dockyards. Most of them had been carried 
out either by the previous Mermnads or by Croesus himself in the past: see, for 
instance, the mention in the list of Ionians, Dorians, and Aeolians (subjugated by 
more than one Mermnad and also by Croesus at the beginning of his reign) and 
that of the Carians, subdued by Alyattes. However, the inclusion of the list in ch. 
28 and the incipit itself mean that Croesus achieved one or more campaigns (for 
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instance to Bithynia or other lands of the catalogue54) and so completed the con-
quest of almost all Anatolia within the Halys after the encounter with Bias and 
before the Medo-Persian war. Evidently he did it in fulfilment of the treaty of 585 
BCE which only recognized the virtual border between Lydia and Media. On his 
part, the Median Cyaxares did the same, when he unified under his dominion all 
of Asia that was beyond the river Halys55. In ch. 28, the accent seems to fall on 
both new and old conquests, that is annexions to Lydia by the Mermnads and 
Croesus himself, along with an update on the geopolitical situation of the Lydian 
kingdom at the time of the latter, when those people, whether or not actively sub-
dued by him, were anyway all subjected to him (cf. ὑπ᾽ ἑωυτῷ εἶχε 
καταστρεψάµενος ὁ Κροῖσος). Also the inclusion of ch. 28 after ch. 26 (on Croe-
sus’ attack on the Greek coast) and ch. 27 (on the immediately following project 
to wage war against the islanders56) seems to confirm that, according to Herodo-
tus, Croesus did lead some military expeditions in Anatolia before receiving Solon 
and the other Greek intellectuals, welcoming the Phrygian Adrastus, undergoing 
the loss of his beloved son Atys, plunging into a deep mourning of two years and 
finally taking an interest in Cyrus’ and Astyages’ war57. Accordingly, Croesus 
would have relinquished an advanced plan for no cogent reasons, since that plan 
would not have been stopped by the attention paid to the Medo-Persian war - ei-
ther the wait for an attack or the apprehension the war could arouse - but by some 
minor campaigns he would have decided to fight without any urgent need and 
even authorized by an international agreement, abandoning expensive invest-
ments in order to concentrate funds on the eastern border which was not even in 
danger. But why would he have changed his mind and suddenly decided to choose 
a different war theatre and attack Anatolian peoples in place of the Ionian islands? 
The reasons for such a refusal remain unclear.  
 
It seems unlikely that Croesus concretely started a shipbuilding plan. Besides 
the reasons listed above, we must recognize that he had not a compelling interest 
in attacking the Greek islands, since he had already subjected the cities of the 
mainland and the politics of the Mermnads concerning the west border of the 
 
54 Strab. XII 4, 3 knows of a campaign led by Croesus to Bithynia. Strabo’s text, wrongly 
suspected as corrupt and variously restored, has been accepted instead by Radt 2004, 484. Hdt. VII 
30, 2 recalls a pillar set up by Croesus at Cydrara, that he locates between Colossae and the borders 
of Phrygia and Lydia. The pillar marked the boundary through an inscription, that supposes a cam-
paign which fixed different borders. See Zgusta 1984 § 641 and § 1399. 
55 Hdt. I 103, 2. 
56 Cf. τὸ ἐνθεῦτεν at § 27.1. 
57 Cf. the restart of ch. 29 κατεστραµµένων δὲ τούτων καὶ προσεπικτωµένου Κροίσου 
Λυδοῖσι, ἀπικνέονται ἐς Σάρδις ... οἱ πάντες ἐκ τῆς Ελλάδος σοφισταί. Such a restart proves that 
the incipit of ch. 28 helps to date the Greek intellectuals’ visits. 
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kingdom were never merely military. They were also focused on the geopolitics 
of the Aegean Sea. The Aegean completed through its harbours the roads which 
crossed Asia Minor and joined to Greece a country which was both philhellenic 
since at least the days of Gyges and interested in having good commercial and 
diplomatic relations with the main Greek cities. In other words, the Aegean was 
meant as a resource both to be controlled through military means and to befriend 
through all the systems able to develop war into peace58. In such a perspective, 
this natural border should be assured and reinforced but not entirely militarized, 
so that most political and military attention could be devoted to the east border, 
historically the more problematical as the usual target of military attacks (for in-
stance, by both the Cimmerians and the Medes59). On Croesus’ Aegean politics 
an important role may also have been played by the Ionian sea-powers and the 
eventuality of an entente among them. Herodotus knows of Samos, Miletus, Pho-
caea, and perhaps Chios as thalassocracies60. Thucydides attributes to them the 
control of the sea, at least for some time, while fighting with Cyrus61. Elsewhere 
Herodotus argues that the Ionian islands surrendered to the Persians for fear of the 
same fate as the Ionians of the mainland62. Yet, he himself also maintains the Io-
nian islands had nothing to fear from the Persian power which could not yet rely, 
in those days, on the Phoenicians’ fleet63. So, the ancient testimonies are not uni-
vocal, but one cannot help but notice that Mytilene and Chios seem to have acted 
from a strong position at the time of Pactyes’ revolt, both asking something in 
exchange for the latter’s delivery to the Persians64. Thus, important Ionian navies 
existed and could be perceived as powerful. Bias’ suggestion to the Ionians to 
leave for Sardinia with the ‘common fleet’ (κοινὸς στόλος) seems to support this 
conclusion65. An Ionian ‘common fleet’ could be a real danger for the Lydian king. 
It is true that the Ionians, and generally speaking the Greeks of Asia Minor, re-
fused to put on an united front on at least two occasions, when they gave support 
to crown prince Croesus, struggling for the throne, and not to his Greek half-
brother Pantaleon, and when they did not bring help to Miletus in war with 
Sadyattes and Alyattes, except for Chios66. However, the role played by the is-
landers’ fleet in Bias’ fictional speech to Croesus confirms it could be perceived 
as dangerous, unless the story itself lacks any sense. A direct threat to all the Ionian 
sea-powers, founded on an advanced shipbuilding program and deeply involving 
 
58 This is the interpretation of Herodotus himself in I 6, 2. 
59 Hdt. I 15 and 74. 
60 Phocaea: Hdt. I 163-4 and 166; I 168. 
61 Thuc. I 13 and 16. 
62 Hdt. I 169, 2. 
63 Hdt. I 143, 1. 
64 Hdt. I 160-1, with Boffo 1983, 45. 
65 Hdt. I 170. 
66 Hdt. I 92 and Nic. Dam. FGrH/BNJ 90, F 65 ( = Xanth. Lyd. BNJ 765, F 41a); Hdt. I 18, 3. 
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the islanders’ interests, would have modified the political, military, and commer-
cial equilibrium of the zone and probably the strategies of the Ionians as well, 
making them join forces against Croesus as they did against Cyrus only some 
years afterwards, with the exception of Miletus. At worst, this may have been a 
concrete possibility that Croesus may have taken into account before planning 
such a policy towards the islands. 
 
Thus, it is easy to surmise that, long after Lydia subdued the Greek cities of 
the mainland and signed accords with the islands, a tradition was shaped or re-
shaped around Bias and his decisive intervention on King Croesus, on the model 
of other diplomatic missions of the Sage. That tradition needed a counterpart, an 
enemy, to be exalted. It needed an ongoing plan, a project under way to be stopped 
in order to let the Greek protagonist steal the show. An important part of such a 
tradition may have been to forge a plan that could be stopped and the plan cannot 
have been anything else than navy building, given that Lydia had no sea-power but 
was meant as the counterpart of the Greek islands which had fleets. The image of 
the Ionians’ common fleet through which Bias warns Croesus may depend on, or 
mirror, the image of the ‘common fleet’ (κοινὸς στόλος) through which Bias sug-
gested to the Ionians, defeated by Harpagus, to leave for Sardinia so as to be free 
from slavery and enjoy prosperity (καὶ οὕτω ἀπαλλαχθέντας σφέας δουλοσύνης 
εὐδαιµονήσειν). Herodotus, who related this advice, highly praised it, comment-
ing favourably on the prosperity (εὐδαιµονέειν) it might have brought, had the Io-
nians followed it 67. Possibly, the advice featured in the 2,000 line poem that Bias, 
according to Diogenes Laertius, devoted to Ionia and the way of making it pros-
perous (τίνα µάλιστα ἂν τρόπον εὐδαιµονοίη). It may have been alluded to in the 
epigraph on his grave which honoured him as a κόσµον Ἴωσι µέγαν68. The tradi-
tion about Bias’ intervention with Croesus could rely directly or indirectly on Bias’ 
advice to the Ionians, as the shared image of Greek ‘slavery’ to either Croesus or 
Cyrus allows us to suppose: cf. τοὺς σὺ δουλώσας ἔχεις, said by Bias to Croesus 
at ch. 27, and both ἀπαλλαχθέντας .. δουλοσύνης and µένουσι δέ σφι ἐν τῇ 
Ἰωνίῃ .. οὐκ .. ἐλευθερίην ἔτι ἐσοµένην, said by Bias to the Ionians at ch. 170. 
Alternatively, this tradition on Croesus and Bias may have been originated in Io-
nian circles, probably from Chios or Miletus or else from Samos, which welcomed 
the Sage as an ambassador and was better focused in the Life of Aesop. However, 
the (extra-Delphic) image of the Greek ‘slavery’ to Croesus is not exclusive but 
also appears in other contexts and above all in Herodotus’ general interpretation of 
the relationship between Croesus and the Greeks of Asia69.  
 
67 Hdt. I 170. On this episode, see Cusumano 1999. 
68 Diog. Laert. I 185.  
69 Hdt. I 6, 2-3; I 28; I 92, 1; I 169, 2. On the Greek sources used by Herodotus in the Lydian 
logos, see Talamo 1985, 150-63; Lombardo 1990, 171-214, esp. 184-5; Flower 1991, 57-77. For the 




To conclude, Croesus’ plan of building a navy can be challenged. It can be 
interpreted as a structural element of a fictional story. In other words, the navy 
plan could have had a function only in the economy of the anecdote: that of found-
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Herodotus 1.27 knows of a shipbuilding project, planned by Croesus and stopped after a 
meeting of the king with either Bias or Pittacus. The historicity of such a plan may be chal-
lenged. It may be interpreted as a fictional story, aiming to boost the role of a Greek Sage in 
front of the Lydian king. A role for a Greek able to influence the great Near Eastern history. 
 
 
 
 
